Author information:
Hubert János Kiss: Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies – Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Senior Researcher, Eötvös Loránd University, Assistant Professor. E-mail: kiss.hubert.janos@krtk.mta.hu
Abstract:
Based on empirical and experimental data, the study provides an overview of the literature on the behaviour of depositors. On this basis, it establishes that depositors’ decisions and thus the phenomenon of mass deposit withdrawals can be explained by fundamental problems as well as coordination among depositors. It points out that depositors’ heterogeneity matters, and the impact of individual characteristics depends on the existence of fundamental problems. Characteristics (such as education, financial sophistication, wealth, bank experience and connections) that make it likely that a depositor collects information on the bank reduce the chance of mass deposit withdrawal in the absence of fundamental problems, but increase the chance of mass deposit withdrawal in the case of such problems. The effect of social networks (and of the information flowing through such) also matters. Deposit insurance reduces the probability of bank runs, but is unable to eliminate them completely. Experimental findings are also in line with empirical experiences.
Cite as (APA):
Kiss, H. J. (2018). Depositors’ Behaviour in Times of Mass Deposit Withdrawals. Financial and Economic Review, 17(4), 95–111. https://doi.org/10.25201/FER.17.4.95111
Column:
Study
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes:
C91, D8, G4, G21,
Keywords:
bank run, depositor’s decision, empirical data, experiment, panic
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