Author information:
Péter Biró: Research Centre for Economics and Regional Studies, Senior Research Fellow. E-mail: biro.peter@krtk.hu
Gyula Magyarkuti: Corvinus University of Budapest, University Docent. E-mail: magyarkuti@uni-corvinus.hu
Abstract:
This paper seeks to provide insight into the field of auction theory to the general readership, the area of the 2020 Nobel laureates in Economic Sciences, Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson. To understand for what reasons and for what purpose they were awarded the Nobel Prize, it is worth taking a step back, looking at this area of economics from a greater distance. For this reason, we not only report the results associated specifically with their names here, but we also review the path to get here. Finally, we provide an outlook for the future of the topic with a brief description of the interdisciplinary areas of engineering economics and market design.
Cite as (APA):
Biró, P., & Magyarkuti, G. (2021). The Work of Milgrom and Wilson in the Theory and Practical Application of Auctions. Financial and Economic Review, 20(1), 127–151. https://doi.org/10.33893/FER.20.1.127151
Column:
Essay
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes:
C78, D44, D47
Keywords:
auction, game theory, mechanism design, market design, engineering economics
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