Author information:
Mario I Blejer: Central Bank of Argentina, former Governor. E-mail: marioiblejer48@gmail.com
Abstract:
Argentina’s repeated failures to achieve lasting inflation control reflect not merely technical mismanagement, but also the country’s deep-seated political and institutional rigidities. Chief among these are the entrenched corporatist structures linking Peronism, organised labour, and the state, which have long constrained productivity and external competitiveness. These structural distortions have created a self-reinforcing inflationary dynamic, undermining stabilisation efforts across successive regimes. Since taking office in 2023, President Milei’s administration has achieved notable short-term gains in fiscal balance and inflation reduction, yet recent political uncertainty and foreign exchange interventions highlight persistent vulnerabilities. Without dismantling the political-economic legacy of Peronism and addressing labour market inflexibility, even well-designed reforms risk failure. The current moment may represent Argentina’s last opportunity to break its inflationary trap and achieve sustainable macroeconomic stability.
Cite as (APA):
Blejer, M.I. (2025). Understanding the Persistence of Inflation in Argentina: From Peron to Milei. Financial and Economic Review, 24(4), 5–21. https://doi.org/10.33893/FER.24.4.5
Column:
Study
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes:
D72, E02, E24, E52, G01
Keywords:
inflation, hyperinflation, central banking, trade unions, fiscal dominance, Argentina, Latin America
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