A betétesek viselkedése tömeges betétkivonás idején

2018. december 17.DOI: https://doi.org/10.25201/HSZ.17.4.95111

Szerzői információk:

Kiss Hubert János: MTA KRTK Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet, tudományos főmunkatárs; ELTE, adjunktus. E-mail:

Absztrakt:

A tanulmány empirikus és kísérleti adatok alapján áttekinti a betétesek viselkedéséről szóló szakirodalmat. Ennek alapján megállapítja, hogy fundamentális problémák és a betétesek közötti koordináció is magyarázhatja a betétesek döntését és így a tömeges betétkivonás kialakulását. Megmutatja, hogy számít a betétesek heterogenitása, az egyéni jellemzők hatása pedig függ fundamentális gondok meglététől. Azon jellemzők (végzettség, pénzügyi felkészültség, vagyon, banki tapasztalat és kapcsolat), amelyek valószínűsítik, hogy a betétes információt gyűjt a bankról, csökkentik (növelik) a tömeges betétkivonás esélyét fundamentális gondok hiányában (esetén). A társadalmi hálózatok (és a rajtuk keresztül áramló információ) hatása is számít. A betétbiztosítás csökkenti a bankrohamok (bank runs) kialakulásának bekövetkeztét, de nem képes teljesen kiküszöbölni. Az empirikus tapasztalatokkal a kísérletek is összhangban állnak.

Hivatkozás (APA):

Kiss, H. J. (2018). A betétesek viselkedése tömeges betétkivonás idején. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 17(4), 95–111. https://doi.org/10.25201/HSZ.17.4.95111

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Rovat:

Tanulmány

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kódok:

C91, D8, G4, G21,

Kulcsszavak:

bankroham, betétesi döntés, empirikus adatok, kísérlet, pánik

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