Milgrom és Wilson munkássága az aukciók elméletében és gyakorlati alkalmazásában

Szerzői információk:

Biró Péter: Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet, tudományos főmunkatárs. E-mail: biro.peter@krtk.hu

Magyarkuti Gyula: Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, egyetemi docens. E-mail: magyarkuti@uni-corvinus.hu

Hivatkozás (APA):

Biró, P., & Magyarkuti, G. (2021). Milgrom és Wilson munkássága az aukciók elméletében és gyakorlati alkalmazásában. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 20(1), 127–151. https://doi.org/10.25201/HSZ.20.1.127151

Rovat:

Esszé

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kódok:

C78, D44, D47

Kulcsszavak:

aukció, játékelmélet, mechanizmustervezés, piactervezés, mérnöki közgazdaságtan

Felhasznált irodalom:

Aggarwal, G. – Pál, D. – Muthukrishnan, S. – Pál, M. (2009): General auction mechanism for search advertising. Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on World Wide Web, Madrid, pp. 241–250.

Ausubel, L. M. – Milgrom, P. R. (2002): Ascending auctions with package bidding. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 1(1): 1–44.

Bichler, M. – Goeree, J.K. (2017): Handbook of spectrum auction design. Cambridge University Press.

Bichler, M. – Ferrell, D. – Fux, V. – Goeree, J.K. (2019): Designing Environmental Markets for Trading Catch Shares. INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, 49(5): 324–337. https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.2019.1003

Biró Péter – Csóka Péter – Kóczy Á. László – Radványi Anna – Sziklai Balázs (2013): Közgazdasági Nobel-emlékdíj 2012. Magyar Tudomány, 174(2): 190–199.

Biró, P. – Bomhoff, M. – Golovach, P.A. – Kern, W. – Paulusma, D. (2014): Solutions for the stable roommates problem with payments. Theoretical Computer Science, 540–541: 53–61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2013.03.027

Budish, E. – Cachon, G.P. – Kessler, J.B. – Othman, A. (2017): Course match: A large- scale implementation of approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes for combinatorial allocation. Operations Research, 65(2): 314–336. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1544

Budish, E. (2011): The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Journal of Political Economy, 119(6): 1061–1103. https://doi.org/10.1086/664613

Chen, B. – Fujishige, S. – Yang, Z. (2016): Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries. Journal of Economic Theory, 165: 25–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.04.003

Clarke, E.H. (1971): Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11: 17–33. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01726210

Nobel Prize Committee (2020): Improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats. Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2020-2. Nobel Prize Committee. https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/nobelp/2020_002.html

Dütting, P. – Henzinger, M. – Weber, I. (2013): Sponsored search, market equilibria, and the Hungarian Method. Information Processing Letters, 113(3): 67–73. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2012.11.006

Edelman, B. – Ostrovsky, M. – Schwarz, M. (2007): Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review 97(1): 242–259. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.1.242

Fleiner, T. (2003): A fixed-point approach to stable matchings and some applications. Mathematics of Operations Research, 28(1): 103–126.

Fox, J.T. (2018): Estimating matching games with transfers. Quantitative Economics, 9(1): 1–38. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE823

Groves, T. (1973): Incentives in teams. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 41(4): 617–631. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085

Gale, D. – Shapley, L.S. (1962): College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1): 9–15. https://doi.org/10.2307/2312726

Haeringer, G. (2018): Market design: auctions and matching. MIT Press.

Hatfield, J.W. – Milgrom, P.R. (2005): Matching with Contracts. American Economic Review, 95(4): 913–935. https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466

Kácsor, E. (2021): Modelling Bidding Behaviour on German Photovoltaic Auctions. Energies 2021, 14(2), 516. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14020516

Kagel, J.H. – Lien, Y., – Milgrom, P. (2010). Ascending prices and package bidding: A theoretical and experimental analysis. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(3): 160-185. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.3.160

Koopmans, T.C. – Beckmann, M. (1957): Assignment problems and the location of economic activities. Econometrica, 25(1): 53–76.

Krishna, V. (2002): Auction Theory. 1st Edition. Elsevier. https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:monogr:9780124262973

Magyarkuti Gyula (2018): Aukcióelmélet előadások. Corvinus University of Budapest. https://doi.org/10.14267/cb.2018k02

Milgrom, P. – Ausubel, L. – Levin, J. – Segal, I. (2012): Incentive auction rules option and discussion. Report for Federal Communications Commission. September 12.

Milgrom, P. (2000): Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2): 245–272. https://doi.org/10.1086/262118

Milgrom, P. (2004): Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511813825

Milgrom, P. – Segal, I. (2017): Designing the US Incentive Auction. In: Bichler, M. – Goeree, J. (ed.): Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University, pp. 803–812. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471609.038

Milgrom, P.R. – Weber, R.J. (1982): A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. Econometrica, 50(5): 1089–1122. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865

Monostori Zoltán (2013): Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók. Közgazdasági Szemle, 60(10): 1048–1074.

Neumann, L.J. – Morgenstern, O. (1944): Theory of games and economic behavior. 60. köt. Princeton University Press.

Newman, N. – Fréchette, A. – Leyton-Brown, K. (2017): Deep optimization for spectrum repacking. Communications of the ACM 61(1): 97–104. https://doi.org/10.1145/3107548

Prendergast, C. (2016): The Allocation of Food to Food Banks. EAI Endorsed Trans. Serious Games, 16(10): e4. https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2261169

Shubik, M. (2004): The Theory of Money and Financial Institutions: Volume 1. The MIT Press.

Shapley, L. S. – Shubik, M. (1971): The assignment game I: The core. International Journal of game theory, 1(1): 111–130.

Varian, H.R. – Harris, Ch. (2014): The VCG auction in theory and practice. American Economic Review, 104(5): 442–445. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.5.442

Vickrey, W. (1961): Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance 16(1): 8–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x

Wilson, R. (1979): Auctions of shares. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93(4): 675–689. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884475

Wilson, R. (2002): Architecture of power markets. Econometrica, 70(4): 1299–1340.

Wilson, R. (2008): Supply function equilibrium in a constrained transmission system. Operations research, 56(2): 369–382. https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0421