Szerzői információk:
Paul De Grauwe https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5225-1301: London School of Economics and Political Science, gazdaságtudományi egyetemi tanár. E-mail: p.c.de-grauwe@lse.ac.uk
Yuemei Ji https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6327-7846: University College London, gazdaságtudományi egyetemi tanár. E-mail: yuemei.ji@ucl.ac.uk
Absztrakt:
A nagyobb központi bankok jelenleg a bőséges kereskedelmi banki tartalékok jellemezte keretek között működnek, következésképpen csak a banki tartalék után járó kamat mértékének növelésével tudják emelni a pénzpiaci kamatokat. Így viszont a jegybankok nyereségéből jelentős összegek vándorolnak a kereskedelmi bankokhoz, ami nem lesz fenntartható, és rontja a monetáris politika transzmissziójának hatékonyságát. A kötelező tartalék megképzéséhez kétszintű rendszert javaslunk, amelyben csak a kötelező tartalék feletti összeg után járna kamat. Ezzel drámaian csökkennének a bankoknak adott juttatások, a központi bankok megtarthatnák a jelenlegi jegybanki műveleteket, és hatásosabban érvényesülne a monetáris politika az infláció elleni küzdelemben.
Hivatkozás (APA):
De Grauwe, P., & Ji, Y. (2024). Az infláció elleni küzdelem a bankoknak juttatott jelentős transzferek nélkül. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 23(4), 80–101. https://doi.org/10.25201/HSZ.23.4.80
Rovat:
Tanulmány
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kódok:
E42, E52, E58
Kulcsszavak:
központi bank, jegybank, infláció, banki tartalék, kamat
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