Monetáris politika Magyarországon rugalmas inflációs célkövetés mellett

Szerzői információk:

Ábel István https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6310-7890: Budapesti Gazdasági Egyetem, professzor. E-mail: abel.istvan@uni-bge.hu

Pierre L. Siklos: Wilfrid Laurier University, professzor; Balsillie School of International Affairs, professzor. E-mail: psiklos@wlu.ca

Hivatkozás (APA):

Ábel, I., & Siklos, P. L. (2024). Monetáris politika Magyarországon rugalmas inflációs célkövetés mellett. Hitelintézeti Szemle, 23(4), 154–177. https://doi.org/10.25201/HSZ.23.4.154

Rovat:

Tanulmány

Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kódok:

E31, E32, E52, E58, E61

Kulcsszavak:

rugalmas inflációs célkövetés, monetáris politika, Taylor-szabály, stabilizációs politika

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